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DIALOGUE
A “New” Heart for Institutions? Some
Elaborations on Voronov and
Weber (2016)
Research examining the role of emotions in in-
stitutional theory has produced an impressive
range of insights (see, for example, Creed,
Hudson, Okhuysen, & Smith-Crowe, 2014, and
Voronov&Vince, 2012), and the recentlypublished
article by Voronov and Weber (2016) gives further
testament to this continuing interest. We are sure
their article will make a valuable contribution to
our understanding of the role of emotions in in-
stitutional theory. As scholars of emotion in or-
ganizational settings, however, we believe that
its contribution could be strengthened if three
particular issues were elaborated a little more.
First, we argue that Voronov and Weber’s view of
emotions as “even more foundational to in-
stitutions than their motivational power” (2016:
456) needs to be clarified. In this regard, we com-
plement the authors’ view by unpacking the ca-
veat that not all employeeswill fit their theorizing.
Second, we show that their key construct of emo-
tional competence (EC), defined as “the ability to
experienceanddisplayemotions that aredeemed
appropriate for an actor role within the in-
stitutional order” (2016: 457), may be less distinct
from emotional intelligence than recognized in
the article. Consequently, we suggest a way to
integrate the concept with what we currently
know about emotional intelligence and, in par-
ticular, the Mayer and Salovey (1997) ability
model of emotional intelligence. Third, we argue
that the authors’ theorizing can be combined with
existing bodies of literature on the role of collec-
tive emotional recognition and norms in in-
stitutional contexts. Taken together, our intention
is to expand on Voronov and Weber’s article in
a manner that we hope will be seen to comple-
ment its conclusions.
ON THE NATURE OF EMOTIONS
IN INSTITUTIONS
A key argument by Voronov and Weber is that
“emotions are central to the very constitution of
people as competent institutional actors that hold
a personal stake in an institution and are enabled
to interpret and perform their own role within an
institutional order” (2016: 456, emphasis added).
While this might apply to some workers, we feel
that there are at least two issues with this state-
ment. First, we discern a contradiction between
the term competent and the authors’ focus on
“actorhood” and “agentic capacities” of individ-
uals (2016: 456). The contradiction arises because
the label of “competence” at work is usually not
self-bestowed but, rather, a managerial evalua-
tion guided by political and economic interests
governing what employees are supposed to do at
work (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999). Second, we
believe that Voronov andWeber could have done
more to develop their position that workers “con-
nect institutions to their sense of self” and, there-
fore, develop a “personal stake” (2016: 456). Our
view is that authors wishing to develop the ideas
byVoronovandWeberneed to recognize that their
ideas apply to a particular cohort of committed
workerswho form thecoreof institutional identity,
but by no means do they represent the total pop-
ulation of the organization.
Although this point of criticism can be leveled
against most publications in institutional theory,
we nonetheless consider the implications of
this: the degree of institutional identity an
employee experiences may act as a potential
boundary condition (see Dubin, 1976) to Voronov
and Weber’s theorizing. We note, moreover, that
similar arguments have already been presented
in AMR in the context of “positive identities”
(Dutton, Roberts, & Bednar, 2011). More important,
however, the idea of a “personal stake” has been
indirectly called into question by Learmonth and
Humphreys, who argue that “work is experienced
by most people, in large measure, as degrading
and exploitative” (2011: 425). Likewise, as Studs
Terkel’s study of hundreds of American workers’
experience at work suggests, work “is, by its very
nature . . . about violence, to the spirit aswell as to
thebody . . . [and]aboutdailyhumiliation” (1974:xi).
And last, the notion of a personal stake pre-
supposes that there is a sense of convergence
among organizational and individual interests,
but this convergence, too, has been challenged
before (Schein, 1968). In this case, therefore, while
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we do agree with Voronov and Weber that some
workersmight develop sucha personal stake, it is
important for readers also to realize that their
theorizing cannot be applied unconditionally to
workers in general.
ON THE NEXUS OF EC AND
EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE
Our second point concerns the EC construct. In
this regard, Voronov and Weber note that “EC
authorizes actorhoodat the level of personal lived
experience by enabling people to regulate their
private emotional experiences in accordance
with institutional ideals and to elicit authoriza-
tion from others through appropriate emotional
displays” (2016: 457). They state that EC may be
related to but distinct from emotional intelligence
based on Mayer, Caruso, and Salovey’s (1999)
definition of emotional intelligence. We are not
convinced that the conceptual delineation is suf-
ficiently distinct to qualify as a new construct,
however. As Suddaby reminds us, “Just as con-
structs are the building blocks of strong theory,
clear and accurate terms are the fundament of
strong constructs” (2010: 347). Thus, we believe
that the arguments presented by Voronov and
Weber to distinguish EC from emotional in-
telligence are not immune to challenge. To begin
with, and as Ashkanasy and Daus (2005) noted,
the most widely accepted valid definition of emo-
tional intelligence is, in fact, the “four-branch”
model given byMayer and Salovey—namely, “the
ability to perceive accurately, appraise, and ex-
press emotion; the ability to access and/or gen-
erate feelings when they facilitate thought; the
ability to understand emotion and emotional
knowledge; and the ability to regulate emotions”
(1997: 10). Numerous reviews and meta-analyses
have demonstrated that these abilities contribute
to work effectiveness (see, for example, Joseph &
Newman, 2010). Ashkanasy (2003) argued further
that these effects extend across all levels of or-
ganizational analysis (i.e., from the within-person
level to the organizational level of analysis). As
such, the position that EC is different from emo-
tional intelligence because the former “is in-
trinsically tied to the specific actor roles within
a particular institutional order” (Voronov&Weber,
2016: 457) does not appear to hold up, at least not
to the extent thatwouldwarrant the introduction of
a new construct. The key point here is that while
emotional intelligence theory may sometimes
appear as too abstract and insensitive to concrete
situations, an individual nevertheless receives
a great deal of stimulus from the social environ-
ment (including institutions and how they impose
rules on how to behave appropriately given the
context or situation at hand [see Diefendorff,
Erickson, Grandey, & Dahling, 2011, and Jordan &
Lindebaum, 2015]).
We also note that, in fact, the idea of EC is al-
ready in use in the literature, defined by Goleman
as “a learned capability based on emotional in-
telligence that results in outstanding performance
at work” (2001: 30). Taken together, we feel that fu-
turedevelopment ofVoronovandWeber’s ideason
EC may more appropriately view EC as a subset
of emotional intelligence rather than as a stand-
alone construct. We understand that emotional
intelligence has been subject to robust criticism,
but as Ashkanasy and Dasborough concluded
in Antonakis, Ashkanasy, and Dasborough, “EI
[emotional intelligence] research is going to be
with us into the foreseeable future” (2009: 259).
ON EC AND WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT
COLLECTIVE EMOTIONAL RECOGNITION
AND NORMS
The third issue we address, in the spirit of ad-
vancing the current debate, concerns how to bet-
ter integrate the concepts of EC and actorhood
within the milieu of the existing literature on col-
lective emotional recognition and norms. In this
regard, we make three points: (1) the need to rec-
ognize the multilevel nature of emotion in orga-
nizations (Ashkanasy, 2003), (2) the relationship of
EC to the concept of emotional aperture (Sanchez-
Burks & Huy, 2009), and (3) the role of emotional
labor display rules as a collective phenomenon
(Diefendorff et al., 2011).
EC As a Multilevel Phenomenon
Despite the fact that emotional intelligence
is inherently an individual-difference variable
pitched in the context of institutional theory, and
despite Voronov and Weber’s characterization
of emotions as “institutionally conditioned and,
thus, endogenous to institutional orders” (2016:
457), we believe the authors’ thesis can be made
still more sensitive to the multilevel nature of
their arguments. We offer two observations in
this respect.
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First, since emotions operate across levels of
analysis (Ashkanasy, 2003), it is arguablewhether
the notion of “institutionally conditioned” yields
identical interpretations across, for instance, the
individual and organizational levels of analysis.
As Lindebaum (2012) suggests, because of the
adverse physiological and psychological effects
that follow from the suppression of emotion in
emotionally standardized organizations, it may
actually be the emotionally intelligent employees
who resist the institutional conditioning of emo-
tions. Therefore, it seems appropriate for future
researchers to consider the possibility that in-
terpretations of events can differ between levels
of analysis, therefore leading to more nuanced
theorizing around the concept of EC.
Second, we refer to the work of To, Tse, and
Ashkanasy (2015), who developed a model illus-
trating how an individual-level phenomenon (in-
dividual creativity) can be translated into effects
manifestedat thegroupandorganizational levels
of analysis. In the instance of the theory de-
veloped by Voronov and Weber, this translates
into emotional intelligence/competency (at the
individual level) coming to be viewed as a group-
and institutional-level phenomenon. Therefore,
when applied in organizational settings, the no-
tion of EC as espoused by Voronov and Weber
would be improved were it to become more sen-
sitive to crossing multiple levels of analysis, in-
cluding individuals, groups, and the organization
as a whole (along with the likelihood that in-
terpretations of events might vary depending on
the level of analysis).
EC and Emotional Aperture
Sanchez-Burks and Huy defined emotional ap-
erture as “the ability to recognize the composition
of diverse emotions in a collective (e.g., group or
business unit)” that “extends existing notions
of emotional competencies (e.g., emotional in-
telligence) that have focused more narrowly on
individual-level emotions” (2009: 22). Clearly, the
ideas espoused by Voronov and Weber fit neatly
into this concept, especially since they describe
ECas“intrinsically tied to thespecificactor roles . . .
as well as to social categories” (2016: 457). Im-
portantly, however, Sanchez-Burks andHuy noted
that “an interestingempiricalquestion [is]whether
individuals who are skilled at recognizing emo-
tions in others at the individual level will be
similarly competent in doing so at the collective
level” (2009: 30). Given that one of the major
contributions of Voronov and Weber’s article
is that it adds to our understanding of such
processes, organizational researchers in future
should find it fruitful to see the two articles as
complementary contributions. In this regard, we
see particular merit in exploring the mecha-
nisms that help (or impair) the “translation” of EC
as an individual-level phenomena into a dyadic,
group, or organizational concept (see, for exam-
ple, Lindebaum & Zundel, 2013).
EC and Emotional Display Rules and Norms
Our final point relates to the nexus of in-
stitutional EC and emotional display rules and
norms. In this regard, Joseph and Newman (2010)
found in a meta-analytical study that while
emotional intelligence predicts performance for
jobs that require high emotional labor, the op-
posite is true in jobs that require low emotional
labor. In this instance, since emotional display
rules in many organizations determine how em-
ployees engage in emotional labor/regulation
(Lindebaum, 2017), the rules’ relationship to
actorhood as defined by Voronov and Weber
(2016) is axiomatic. The same holds in the in-
stance of organizational norms that relate to
emotional labor and expression (Ashkanasy &
Ha¨rtel, 2014). As such, this idea underscores the
multilevel nature of emotional competency as
a determining factor of individual and in-
stitutional performance. In order to dealwith this
issue, we suggest that Voronov and Weber’s
theory could also be improved if it were to in-
clude more explicit references to differences in
EC across levels.
In summary, while the Voronov and Weber
(2016) article most certainly advances our un-
derstanding of the role of emotions and EC/
emotional intelligence as important determi-
nants of institutional performance, there are
some aspects we believe need to be clarified.
We hope this dialogue piece will help man-
agement scholars understand better and apply
more rigorously the ideas these authors offer in
three ways: (1) recognizing that not all in-
stitutional employees are fully committed so
that EC theory may be limited in this regard, (2)
giving more recognition to the nexus of EC
and emotional intelligence, and (3) recognizing
that EC is a multilevel phenomenon related to
the idea of emotional aperture and, therefore,
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determined in part by an organization’s emo-
tional display rules and norms.
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